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BIANNUAL SURVEY
issue was academic and at most, petitioner was entitled to a de-
claratory judgment. Special term rejected this contention, holding
that petitioner should not be denied what would otherwise be
appropriate relief 284 on the sole ground that he had complied
with an administrative determination. Standing was justified by
the fact that petitioner was still amenable to further sanctions. s5
It has long been settled that some form of review is available
to one who has complied with an administrative penalty. De-
claratory judgment has been the most obvious form of relief, but
certiorari 286 and direct appeal 's" have likewise been allowed. This
case clarifies the fact that Article 78, which is most expedient,
may serve as an alternative to declaratory judgment to review
administrative penalties which have been served. 
8
MVAIC
MVAIC endorsement reducing award to insured to extent of
workmen's compensation benefits held valid.
In the case of Durant v. MVAIC,2s 9 petitioner sought arbitra-
tion as an "insured person" under the terms of an MVAIC en-
dorsement contained in his motor vehicle insurance policy. This
endorsement, which is required in all New York motor vehicle
policies,2 90 provided that workmen's compensation benefits would
serve to reduce any MVAIC award. The appellate division held
that the statutory power of MVAIC to prescribe "terms and
conditions" 2"1 did not include the authority to so limit the award.29 2
The Court of Appeals reversed, construing the statute as authorizing
MVAIC to "prescribe the conditions of coverage" and thus to limit
the arbitration award.
9 3
284 See generally 8 WEiNsTmIN, KoRN & MILza, op. cit. supra note 267,
7801.02.285 Leo Newman's Theatre Ticket Office, Inc. v. DiCarlo, supra note 283,
at 551, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
286 See People ex rel. Albrecht v. Harnett, 221 App. Div. 487, 224 N.Y.
Supp. 97 (4th Dep't 1927).
287 See People v. Marks, 64 Misc. 679, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1106 (Gen. Sess.
1909).
281 By this decision, the court necessarily held that declaratory judgment is
inadequate alternative relief. Otherwise, CPLR 7801(1) would have required
dismissal of the petition.
289 15 N.Y.2d 408, 207 N.E2d 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965).
290 N.Y. INS. LAw § 167(2-a).
291 Ibid. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 606 for the expressly delegated powers of
MVAIC.292 Durant v. MVAIC, 20 App. Div. 2d 242, 246, 246 N.Y.S.2d 548, 553
(2d Dep't 1964) ; see The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 38 ST.
JoHx's L. Rxv. 406, 458 (1964).
293 Durant v. MVAIC, 15 N.Y.2d 408, 411, 207 N.E.2d 600, 260 N.Y.S.2d
1, 2 (1965).
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The basic claim of the appellate division and the dissent in the
Court of Appeals was that since "qualified persons" are not subject
to this reduction,294 there is no reason to believe that the legislature
deemed it allowable to so limit the insured. Moreover, logic would
seem to dictate that the insured be afforded greater benefits since
he, and not the qualified person, has paid a premium. This in-
consistency of treatment might even be said to be so basic as to
deny the insured "equal protection of the laws." 295
It is clear that the framers of Article 17-A of the Insurance
Law intended no greater benefit to qualified persons in this regard.
Each person coming within the purview of this statute was to be af-
forded the same benefits as if his tortfeasor were covered by a $10,000
liability policy.2 99 Perhaps, as the Court of Appeals has stated, MVA-
IC's authority was meant to extend beyond mere technicality to a
broad scope of discretion in determining coverage. However, the
authority exercised by MVAIC herein and its affirmance by the
courts, would seem to be contrary to the basic purpose of the
statute.
MVAIC entitled to recover from insured person's action arising
from the same accident as prior arbitraton award - but
intervention under CPLR 1013 denied.
In McGee v. Horvat,297 plaintiff, an insured person, recovered
a $10,000 arbitration award for injuries inflicted by a hit-and-run
driver. Thereafter, plaintiff brought suit against two insured
motorists who were involved in the same accident. MVAIC moved
to intervene under CPLR 1013 on the ground that it was entitled
to recover from any judgment to the extent of the payment made
to plaintiff. Defendant cross-moved to amend his answer to the
effect that his liability should be reduced by the arbitration award.
The second department held that MVAIC was entitled to
recover as of right.2 9 8  Since the statutory purpose of the MVAIC
law was to allow recovery as if the tortfeasor were covered by
a $10,000 liability policy,2 99 a double benefit, which would be effected
294 This was admitted by the majority in the instant case. Ibid. See N.Y.
Ixs. LAW § 610.
295 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.296 McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 38, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909,
913 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 922, 188 N.E.2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1963); see also N.Y. INs. LAW § 600(2).
29723 App. Div. 2d 271, 260 N.Y.S.2d 345 (2d Dep't 1965).
298 McGee v. Horvat, 23 App. Div. 2d 271, 274-75, 260 N.Y.S.2d 345, 349-50
(2d Dep't 1965). MVAIC's failure to appeal the unconditional affirmance
of the arbitrator's award was held insignificant. Id. at 275, 260 N.Y.S.2d
at 349.
299 See materials cited note 296 supra.
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